The Spring Meeting is the largest gathering of competition, consumer protection, and data privacy profes­sionals globally, with lawyers, academics, economists, enforcers, journalists, and students from around the world. During the 2026 Spring Meeting, Axinn associates attended thought leadership panels to capture key insights. Their report of the takeaways from three panels discussing cartel enforcement trends and developments appears below. It covers the panels, “Enforcers Updated: Cartels,” “Cartel Enforcement in a New World Order,” and “Sustainable Cooperation, a Double-Edged Sword.”

 To read all the articles in the series, click here.

Authorities worldwide are continuing to prioritize cartel enforcement, keeping a vigilant eye on sectors with broad social impact as well as cartel activity arising from geopolitical and sustainability issues. Regulators and enforcers are likewise deploying new detection strategies and developing leniency and whistleblower programs to support these enforcement goals.

Enforcers Update: Cartels

The “Enforcers Update: Cartels” panel discussed cartel enforcement trends outside the United States. Antitrust authorities are intensifying efforts to detect and deter collusion, especially new forms of coordination effectuated through data and technology that can be more difficult to detect than coordination through more traditional means.

Panelists from antitrust enforcement agencies around the world emphasized that fighting cartels remains a top priority. Authorities in the European Union, Canada, Brazil, Japan, and Mexico continue to pursue classic violations like price fixing and bid rigging, particularly in sectors with broad social impact such as food, infrastructure, and public procurement. Panelists highlighted cases involving, for instance, bread price fixing in Canada and sesame oil collusion in Japan to demonstrate enforcer attention on everyday consumer markets.

At the same time, panelists explained, enforcers are increasingly focused on what they described as more subtle forms of coordination. Many countries are challenging information exchanges and algorithmic price setting as equivalents of explicit agreements to collude. Agencies are adapting legal standards to address these types of arrangements, with Mexico notably lowering the burden of proving formal agreements in such cases. 

Detection tools are also evolving rapidly and often involve artificial intelligence and sophisticated monitoring software. Authorities are investing in data analytics, screening tools, and whistleblower programs to proactively identify misconduct. While leniency programs remain important, panelists observed that program effectiveness varies by jurisdiction, with several countries discussing recent reforms to encourage earlier self-reporting.

Panelists explained that, overall, global antitrust enforcement is becoming more aggressive, tech-savvy, and coordinated—and aimed at staying a step ahead of emerging tools of coordination.

Cartel Enforcement in a New World Order

The “Cartel Enforcement in a New World Order” panel addressed the complexities of multi-jurisdictional cartel enforcement. Panelists recognized that competition policy drives enforcement policy, and they identified three approaches to competition policy: (i) the European approach, with a focus on ex ante regulation and sustainability, as well as integration of consumer protection, competition, and data privacy regimes; (ii) the American approach, with its focus on consumer welfare and recent emphasis on labor, big tech, and industrial labor policy; and (iii) the Chinese state capitalist model, which integrates industrial strategy, national security, and competition law. Each region’s geopolitical influence tends to determine the breadth of global adoption of its competition policy. Specifically, panelists noted pressure in Latin America to align with either the American or European model and discussed how smaller countries that receive Chinese investment and support may be pressured to adopt Chinese-style competition regimes.

Panelists next discussed the extent to which laws and norms around the world converge or diverge over time. Panelists noted the importance of convergence to foster greater stability and predictability for multinational firms. Panelists had hoped that the rise of global institutions during the late 20th and early 21st centuries would improve convergence; instead, they noted, the “new world order” is trending towards divergence, with neither the United States nor the European Union prioritizing global convergence. Recognizing the efficiency and predictability gains from similar or at least complementary enforcement regimes around the world, panelists agreed that increased procedural convergence and cross-border collaboration would be beneficial. 

Panelists also discussed the rise of global export cartels seeking to avoid price competition because of the United States’ new tariffs and national economic protectionism. Panelists predicted that export cartels would continue to increase, in part because some regulators have responded by watering down the laws prohibiting such cartels. In Guatemala, for example, a new law exempts horizontal export cartels from the per se rule. But the same horizontal cartel selling domestically into Guatemalan markets would remain per se illegal.

Finally, panelists discussed novel uses of technology, leniency applications and whistleblower rewards programs. Spain is developing its own AI tools to identify bid rigging in public procurement markets and has shared its lessons learned with DOJ and fellow European enforcers. Spain also uses technology to enhance its whistleblower program, sharing encrypted keys with whistleblowers to maintain ongoing conversations after their initial tips. Panelists also discussed divergence of leniency rules, even between neighbors. Colombia’s 2022 leniency rules exempt applicants from joint-and-several liability of co-conspirators. And although Colombia does not have a whistleblower rewards program, its neighbor Peru does. Given the different incentives in these jurisdictions, potential whistleblowers may go forum shopping for the highest reward, and jurors may be skeptical of evidence gathered from them. 

Sustainable Cooperation, A Double-Edged Sword

Panelists for “Sustainable Cooperation, a Double-Edged Sword” focused their discussion on the response of competition authorities around the world to environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) objectives, particularly sustainability goals (e.g., net-zero carbon initiatives). Although most authorities will scrutinize ESG coordination to ensure participants are not masking cartel activity, the extent to which authorities accept the validity of ESG as a justification has become jurisdiction-specific and politicized.

At one end of the spectrum, the European Union has facilitated ESG initiatives, particularly those focused on sustainability. Indeed, sustainable development is rooted in the European Union’s constitutional provisions. The European Commission (“EC”) has recognized that limited coordination may be needed to achieve that goal, and it does not view such coordination as inconsistent with competition. Instead, the EC views sustainability as a competition driver, enhancing consumer welfare by addressing negative externalities, mitigating first-mover disadvantages and free-riding issues, and achieving economies of scale. Accordingly, since as early as 2022, the EC has allowed ESG-related cooperation that satisfies certain “soft” safe harbor requirements, including transparency, voluntariness, and information sharing limited to only what is necessary and proportional. In 2025, the EC issued guidance letters on several sustainability initiatives. In one, the EC evaluated a proposal between Occitanie regional producers of organic and Haute Valeur Environnementale wine, on the one hand, and buyers, on the other, to set indicative bulk prices for two years. The EC concluded the proposal was permissible because it would support the survival of sustainable wine practices in the region.

The United States is at the other end of the spectrum, offering no uniform guidance. As panelists explained, U.S. competition laws do not provide any sustainability exemptions or safe harbors for ESG initiatives. ESG-related coordination thus could be considered unlawful cartel conduct under federal law. States’ tolerance of ESG initiatives varies. Panelists observed that Republican-led states have taken aggressive stances against ESG-related coordination, challenging financial corporate sustainability initiatives as illegal output restriction agreements and boycotts.¹ By contrast, according to panelists, Democrat-led states are more tolerant of such coordination, declining to recognize ESG commitments alone as violations of antitrust law. That said, at least one Democrat-led state, Michigan, has pursued enforcement action against coordinated efforts to thwart sustainability. Michigan brought a complaint against gasoline companies, alleging an illegal conspiracy to stall development of renewable energy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and state antitrust laws.² In short, in the United States, sustainability policy is sometimes used as a sword that can cut both ways, and sometimes it is used as a shield.

Panelists noted there is a wide variety of other approaches along this spectrum. For example, Canada allows the Commissioner of Competition to assess whether a proposed environmental collaboration is likely to be anticompetitive and, if not, issue a certificate approving the collaboration. However, in an environment of increased globalization, divergent policies have been a challenge to organizations with ESG goals. Panelists did not see the problem going away in the near future, noting that organizations should consider the antitrust implications of participating in any ESG (or anti-ESG) commitments that could be viewed as coordinated, and they should closely monitor regulatory developments in all relevant jurisdictions.

¹E.g., Texas v. BlackRock, Inc., No. 24-cv-00437 (E.D. Tex.).
²Michigan v. BP, P.L.C., No. 26-cv-00254 (W.D. Mich.).