The Spring Meeting is the largest gathering of competition, consumer protection, and data privacy profes­sionals globally, with lawyers, academics, economists, enforcers, journalists, and students from around the world. During the 2026 Spring Meeting, Axinn associates attended thought leadership panels to capture key insights. Their report of the takeaways from four panels discussing tech-related enforcement and policy appears below. It covers the panels, “Big Tech Lawsuits/Enforcement Update,” “One Merger, Many Masters,” “Digital Markets: Deal or No Deal,” and “Talent or Takeover? New Deal in Tech and AI.”

To read all the articles in the series, click here.

Key Takeaways

Competition in digital markets remains at the forefront of antitrust thinking as tech companies continue to grow and innovate at pace and scale. Drawing from four sessions covering trends in litigation and enforcement, multi-jurisdictional merger coordination, refusals to deal, and “acquihire” mergers, a few key takeaways shed light on where enforcers and practitioners see the intersection of tech and antitrust going in the near future: 

• Despite rapid product innovations, traditional analytical tools in the antitrust toolkit are still relevant to how enforcers and courts view modern digital markets.
• Courts continue to place a premium on factual, evidence-based analysis. Leveraging hard facts into a compelling narrative is a crucial part of educating and persuading both regulators and judges.
• Authorities are opting for behavioral over structural remedies, recognizing the need for flexible solutions in emerging and dynamic markets. 

Litigation Update

The “Big Tech Lawsuits/Enforcement Update” panelists offered their perspectives on how courts and enforcers are approaching high-profile investigations and litigations in the tech space. They noted two trends in recent litigation: Article III judges (i) are engaging in extensive fact-finding and (ii) may be favoring behavioral remedies over structural ones. Specifically:

• Past opinions. The panelists discussed the FTC v. Meta case at length and described it as an important data point for technology companies monitoring merger and monopolization exposure. Some panelists attributed the government's loss in that case to its chosen venue (D.D.C.) and expert witness selection. They opined that, in the future, the government may instead litigate more cases in rocket docket venues like the Eastern District of Virginia. Panelists also discussed the Google Search and Ad Tech cases. They noted that legal uncertainty remains as to two-sided markets in the wake of Ohio v. American Express Co., underscoring the need for Congressional intervention to provide clarity.
• Forward thinking. Panelists described Judge Brinkema's (E.D. Va.) forthcoming remedies opinion in the Google Ad Tech case as one to watch for, particularly concerning whether its approach to remedies squares with Judge Mehta's (D.D.C.) approach in the Google Search case. Whatever the outcome, this decision will provide another important data point about how courts approach structural remedies in technology markets.
• State enforcement likely to continue. Finally, each panelist agreed that state attorneys general are at the forefront of antitrust enforcement, citing the Live Nation trial as an illustrative example of how states may choose to carry enforcement actions forward even without federal participation. A similar dynamic may soon play out in the AI space: the Trump administration's "AI Action Plan,” released in July 2025, made no mention of federal antitrust enforcers, let alone what role they would play in policing competition issues arising from AI development. Panelists said that companies should expect that state attorneys general—particularly in California, New York, Texas, and Colorado—will be among the most active antitrust enforcement jurisdictions over the next several years, stepping in where federal enforcers may not.

Multi-Jurisdictional Mergers

At “One Merger, Many Masters,” an international panel of practitioners from Brazil, China, the European Union, and the United States debated the challenges of coordinating review of multi-jurisdictional mergers, using a hypothetical multi-billion dollar tech acquisition between vertically related parties as an illustrative example. The discussion was framed around four key considerations for practitioners facing a multi-jurisdictional regulatory process: 

• Market definition in the digital sector remains a challenge. “Ecosystem” theories (i.e., that the area of effective competition occurs across an ecosystem of interconnected products or services) offer a tempting approach to account for the intricacies of tech mergers, but many authorities remain skeptical about embracing cross-border and multi-level markets.
• Competitive assessments will require enforcers to balance traditional competitive concerns within their borders against the inevitable international dimensions of major tech transactions. Separately, panelists agreed that an ecosystem approach might make more sense as a theory of harm rather than a way to define a market, given that certain monopolization and abuse-of-dominance theories allow consideration of effects beyond a single defined market.
• Remedies may not fall into neat structural or behavior buckets. The panelists agreed that, in the context of the vertical tech merger hypothetical, remedies would likely be used to address foreclosure concerns, as is often the case for vertical mergers. At the same time, panelists thought that regulators would likely also consider cross-border remedies, though they recognized that building consensus between jurisdictions remains a hurdle.
• Coordinating across filing jurisdictions is critical to navigating the different timelines and country-specific competition concerns. Panelists agreed that parties should be proactive in building a fact-based affirmative narrative early and putting clearance “wins” on the scoreboard to get wind in the sails. 

Panelists opined that, while regulators may be beginning to converge around similar approaches—e.g., ecosystem theories of harm—results may continue to diverge, especially when the competitive effects of the merger are unevenly distributed across jurisdictions. 

Refusals to Deal

“Digital Markets: Deal or No Deal” focused on digital-markets cases that rejected or accepted the argument that a monopolist was justified in refusing to deal with a third party (including due to justifications based on the protection of intellectual property). The panel included Axinn partner Jackie Chou Lem and unfolded as a mock game show, with contestants evaluating real-world-inspired hypotheticals and deciding whether they must agree to “deal” with a third party to avoid an antitrust violation or whether they could decide “no deal” without violating the antitrust laws. In the course of the game, three key insights emerged about refusal-to-deal cases in today’s digital markets: 

• First, there is a general reluctance to impose liability for a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to deal with or license to a rival, stemming from concerns that forced sharing with rivals will deter innovation and investment by both the monopolist and the rival. These concerns are even more prevalent in the digital space: as one panelist noted, plaintiffs have a much better chance of winning if they can get out of the refusal-to-deal framework entirely.
• Second, traditional antitrust principles developed in the case law are still relevant in the digital era. Recent cases against Google, Meta, Apple, and Costar were cited as examples of how those principles can be adapted to more modern products and markets. Panelists noted several justifications for refusals to deal that have heightened importance in the tech sector, such as security concerns that may lead companies to want to keep strict control over what third party products or services are offered on or through their products.
• Third, refusal-to-deal cases are hard. The case law is not black-and-white, and cases are heavily fact-dependent. Tellingly, the panelists disagreed on nearly every question, as none of the hypotheticals got more than 60% consensus. As one panelist pointed out, cases often turn on the story that parties are able to tell. Practitioners should consider not only technical doctrine but also the facts that will help shape their best narrative. 

Acquihires

Finally, “Talent or Takeover? New Deals in Tech and AI” examined “reverse acquihires” and other novel transaction structures. Antitrust regulators are increasingly expressing concerns that some of these deals—which often are not deemed to meet pre-merger notification requirements—may replicate the effects of traditional acquisitions without formal transfer of the business. Some panelists argued that many such deals are commercially rational, often procompetitive, and not well captured by “disguised merger” narratives.

Panelists, including Axinn antitrust partner Craig Minerva, discussed several key themes:

• Substance vs. Structure. Many of these deals involve no acquisition at all—only non-exclusive IP licenses and the hiring of key personnel. But enforcers are increasingly signaling they will look past form to substance: if a deal effectively transfers a firm’s competitive capability or position, it may be evaluated as a merger.
• Benefits vs. Risks. Panelists highlighted several potential procompetitive benefits that may arise from these arrangements, including accelerating innovation, expanding exit pathways for startup founders, and intensifying competition for AI talent. But they also recognized enforcers may raise concerns about potential harms, including talent hoarding, loss of nascent competition, and structuring to avoid pre-merger reportability and review.
• Cross-ownership and strategic investment arrangements are less novel. Panelists noted that cross-ownership and strategic investment arrangements are less novel than acquihires and are evaluated under established antitrust frameworks, including those that assess issues of governance influence, access to competitively sensitive information, and alignment of incentives. Panelists recognized that these deal structures can foster procompetitive collaboration and innovation, but also may raise concerns about the softening of competition or anticompetitive coordination, depending on the degree of control or visibility obtained via the arrangement.
• UK and European experience may provide insights. Mechanisms such as the Digital Markets Act provide some additional transparency around so-called “gatekeeper” deals, and authorities like the CMA have broad call-in powers.
• U.S. enforcers signal interest in closer scrutiny. In the United States, enforcers are exploring whether these deals should be more clearly captured under HSR reportability rules, though existing tools (including Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act) provide avenues to address problematic deals. Pre-merger review is often preferred as a practical matter because once consummated, these deals are difficult to unwind and remedies are inherently difficult.

Panelists explained that this is an evolving area and one in which deals should not be presumed benign, harmful, or evasive. Rather, acquihire arrangements and other novel transaction structures require a fact-specific inquiry into (i) what exactly is being transferred and (ii) whether the effect of the transfer is likely to harm competition or facilitate efficient talent deployment and continued innovation.